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Indirect Measures in Evaluation:
On Not Knowing What We Don’t Know
Linda Heath, Adam DeHoek, & Sara House Locatelli,

Loyola University Chicago
Evaluators frequently make use of indirect measures of participant learning or skill mastery, with participants
either being asked if they have learned material or mastered a skill or being asked to indicate how confident
they are that they know the material or can perform the task in question. Unfortunately, myriad research in
social psychology has demonstrated that people are very poor judges of their own levels of accomplishment.
In this paper, the social psychological dynamics that contribute to biased self-assessments are overviewed.
These include the self-serving bias (e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975), the better-than-average effect (e.g., Alicke et al.,
1995; Brown, 1986), and the overconfidence phenomenon (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Methods of
correcting these biased reports are generally ineffective, as illustrated by Kruger and Dunning’s (1999)
findings that people lowest in mastery generally lack the metacognition even to understand what mastery
looks like. As this type of person learns the skill in question, they often realize the level of their ignorance and
lower their self-reported knowledge and skill levels. Although indirect measures of participant learning or
mastery might tell us something about the level of confidence of the participants, they probably tell us little
about actual ability or knowledge. Implications for applied research are discussed.
Many, if not most, interventions involve teaching
someone something, whether it is teaching women in
developing countries how to run their own businesses,
teaching high school freshmen how to perform CPR, or
even teaching teachers how to teach. This newly learned
knowledge or skill will then presumably lead to more
income and better living conditions, more lives saved, or
better student learning. Linking the learning to the
ultimate outcome, however, is not simple. For example,
if students do poorly on tests, it might be that the
teachers had not mastered the new skills or that the
students were unmotivated or too stressed to learn. As
plentiful as the complications are that intervene between
the program and the ultimate outcome, however,
evaluators realize that without actual knowledge or skill
mastery in the first place, the intended downstream
effects will never occur. Further, if evaluators cannot
document that the knowledge or skill mastery took place,
the staff of a failed program cannot know where the
critical problems in the intervention reside, hindering
further program refinement. Clearly, evaluating the
extent of knowledge or skill mastery is critical not only
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for summative (or final assessment) evaluations, but also
for formative (or developmental) evaluations.

Use of indirect measures
Because direct evaluations of knowledge and skill
mastery are not simple to conduct for practical and
sometimes legal or ethical reasons, evaluators often make
use of indirect, rather than direct, measures of learning.
Such indirect measures are seen as useful by many
teachers (Noonan & Duncan, 2005) and display
consistent patterns among participants, though much
weaker relationships to teacher assessments (Ross, 2006).
Participants self-report how much they have learned,
how confident they are they have mastered the skill, or
how comfortable they feel with the skill or domain. This
approach is based on the assumption that people can
accurately judge their own abilities and knowledge-levels.
Such indirect measures of knowledge and skill attainment
are presumed to be a solution to the problems that direct
measurement present. Unfortunately, such a move is
going from the proverbial frying pan into the fire, as
1
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indirect measures of learning are replete with their own
problems.
This article overviews the factors that compromise
the validity of indirect measures in applied settings.
Research on these factors (e.g., Kruger & Dunning, 1999,
2002), as well as criticisms of such research (e.g., Krueger
& Mueller, 2002) are published primarily in psychology
journals, making these issues less well-known to
evaluators and others who often use such indirect
assessments in applied settings. The implications of this
body of research for applied research are examined here.
Among the many factors that can influence the validity
of indirect measures of student learning, two are
particularly problematic. First, most assessments of
learning, but particularly those in areas that do not
provide immediate, irrefutable feedback concerning
success or failure, are prone to numerous distortions that
are well-documented in psychology, such as the selfserving bias (e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975), the better-thanaverage effect (e.g., Alicke, Klotz, Breitenbecher, Yurak,
& Vredenburg, 1995; Brown, 1986), and the
overconfidence phenomenon (Tversky & Kahneman,
1979). Second, and perhaps the more serious problem,
research by Kruger and Dunning (1999, 2002) has shown
that people at the lowest levels of actual mastery lack the
metacognitive understanding of what mastery even is,
leading them to wildly over-estimate their own skills,
often believing themselves to be above average. Each of
these problems with indirect assessments of mastering
knowledge and skills will be discussed in turn.

Social Psychological explanations for
biased self-evaluation in applied settings
Dunning, Heath, and Suls (2004) have described
how and why these errors occur in areas ranging from
health, to education, to the workplace. In that
monograph they also document the lack of
correspondence between people’s self-assessments and
the assessments of others, such as doctors or teachers, as
well as the lack of congruence between people’s selfassessments and their objective performance.
In the education area, accurate assessment of how
much you have learned and what skills you really have
would obviously be useful for determining how much to
study, which advanced classes to take, and when to feel
confident in performing a new task. Although the
relationship between self-assessment of skills or
knowledge and the objective level of that skill or
knowledge is not zero, it is, in the words of Dunning, et
al. (2004) “meager to modest” (p. 85). For example,
people’s estimates of their own IQ’s correlate between .2
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and .3 with their actual performance on IQ tests. Metaanalyses of the relationship between self-assessment and
objective performance find correlations ranging from .21
to .39 (Dunning, et al., 2004). On the bright side, the
correlation between students’ assessments of their
learning in classes and teachers’ assessments of their
learning does tend to increase from introductory to more
advanced classes. Before becoming too excited, however,
it must be noted that undergraduate pre-medical
students’ self-assessments’ correlations with ratings of
their own abilities and knowledge by teachers or
supervisors actually got lower as time went on, with the
students’ final self-assessments of knowledge not
correlating at all with their medical school board scores.
The major social psychological phenomenon at
work in biased self-evaluation is the self-serving bias
(e.g., Miller & Ross, 1975). This is the tendency for
individuals to accept personal responsibility for success,
while failing to take such responsibility for failure. This
bias has been explained through both motivational and
cognitive means. It is generally held that individuals have
a desire for self-enhancement through both positive selfpresentation and self-esteem maintenance. In times of
success as well as in times of failure, individuals look for
ways to present themselves positively to others. In cases
of success, individuals may choose to publicly enhance
their achievements, alerting others to the fact that they
have succeeded; on the other hand, it is also possible that
these individuals will downplay their achievements, if
modesty is in order. Privately, people are likely to
enhance their accomplishments, thus allowing
themselves to maintain a high level of self-esteem. In
cases of failure, individuals may publicly shun
responsibility for an action, blaming others or the
situation rather than themselves, if this course of action
is likely to be perceived more positively by others.
However, they may accept some of the blame for failure
if humility will place them in a better light. In private, it is
likely that individuals will blame the situation or others in
order to maintain their own self-esteem. Thus, in both
success and failure, individuals are able to present
themselves positively. In addition, they are able to
maintain the most positive self-esteem. In this way,
people can experience self-enhancement both publicly
and privately.
Just as the self-serving bias affects the responsibility
that people take for a given outcome, it also affects the
evaluation of one’s own actions following both success
and failure. Primarily, individuals are more likely to
accept responsibility for expected outcomes rather than
unexpected outcomes. Because individuals often intend
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to and believe that they will succeed, people most often
expect positive outcomes. In addition, people believe
that they have more control over outcomes that they
expect. Therefore, when individuals succeed, be it as
students on an exam or investors on the stock market,
they are likely to view this success as driven by their own
efforts and talents, rather than merely the result of the
situation. Research has shown that unexpected
outcomes—be they positive or negative—will likely be
attributed to external forces. As negative outcomes are
often unexpected, these outcomes will more often be
attributed to something outside of the individual and out
of one’s control. Therefore, when individuals fail, they
will likely see this failure as the result of something that
someone else did or did not do, or of the situation itself,
rather than reflective of the self. Thus, using the same
examples as those above, if students fail an exam, or
brokers lose a significant amount of money, they are
likely to perceive this as outside of their control. When it
comes to self-evaluation, individuals are unlikely to
recognize the true source of the outcomes in both
successes and failures. Because of this, they are also
unlikely to be able to effectively monitor how successful
they would be at demonstrating the skills they believe
they have mastered.
People also demonstrate self-serving effects and
biased self-evaluation via a psychological phenomenon
known as the better-than-average effect (e.g., Alicke et
al., 1995; Brown, 1986). This phenomenon suggests that
people believe that they possess positive traits to a
greater degree and negative traits to a lesser degree than
does the average person. Similarly, individuals believe
that they know more and perform better on certain tasks
than the average person. Therefore, if individuals rated
their own abilities to complete specific tasks
successfully—be it how effective they are at writing a
paper or predicting changes in the stock market—they
would likely state that they were better than the average
person at such tasks. This effect is particularly
pronounced when the comparison target is
nonindividuated, such as "the average college student”.
In addition, College Board studies found that 60% of
high school seniors rated themselves in the top 10% in
terms of “ability to get along with others,” and 25% rated
themselves in the top 1% on this ability. The effect does
not only hold for students. Ninety-four percent of
college professors claim to do above-average work
(Cross, 1977).
Finally,
Tversky
and
Kahneman
(1979)
demonstrated an over-confidence phenomenon, whereby
people’s confidence in their assessments is non-
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significantly related to their accuracy. Clearly, we don’t
know what we know, but we are confident we do. This
phenomenon exacerbates the biases discussed above.
Not only are we wrong, but we are quite confident we
are right!

Attempts to increase the
validity of biased self-evaluations
Unfortunately, remedying the problem of biased
self-evaluation is not simply a matter of giving clearer
feedback and more practice making these selfassessments for students to get it right. A study by
Hacker, Bol, Horgan, and Rakow (2000) showed that
higher performing students did get better able to predict
their exam grades as the semester wore on, but poorly
performing students continued to wildly over-estimate
their performance, being not at all fazed by their
repeated failures to achieve those high scores they had
previously predicted.
So what’s going on? Is it that students just don’t
know how to assess performance? No, because they do
pretty well when assessing other students’ performance.
A meta-analysis found that the correlation between
assessments of a peer and teachers’ assessments averaged
.72. So it seems to be something about assessing one’s
self that leads people astray.
One factor that contributes to erroneous selfassessments, as mentioned before, is that for many types
of learning, there is not immediate, irrefutable feedback
concerning mastery of a skill or knowledge area. For
some learning outcomes (e.g., learning to do a triplebackflip, learning to insert an IV needle, being
conversant in a foreign language with native speakers of
that language), students can receive immediate,
irrefutable feedback and clearly know if they have failed
to master the skill. They fall on their heads, the patient
screams in pain and no medicine flows through the IV,
or the native speaker looks at the student in total
incomprehension. An indirect measure of this type of
learning outcome (e.g., “How confident are you in your
ability to perform a triple-backflip?”) might lead the
student to ponder “Well, the last five times I tried it I
landed on my head, so I guess I’m not very good at it.”
Nevertheless, motivational biases and selective recall
could still lead to answers that are a bit more positive
than the number of head-landings would warrant. This
said, the measure could still be useable, given that its
imperfections are recognized.
When we enter the realm of most student learning
outcome assessments, however, we leave immediate,

3

Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation, Vol. 17 [2012], Art. 6

Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, Vol 17, No 6
Heath, DeHoek, & Locatelli, Indirect Measures in Evaluation
irrefutable feedback behind. “How confident are you in
your understanding of the causes of the Civil War;”
“how confident are you in your ability to write a
grammatically correct essay,” and “how well do you
understand the auditory system” all lack the immediate
bump on the head or screaming patient of the previous
examples. Students might factor in their course grades as
proxies for their mastery, but that still leaves ample room
for motivational biases, selective recall, and other
psychological factors to distort their responses.
One clue that psychological factors are distorting
self-assessments is the fact that self-assessments are
overwhelmingly more positive than warranted. If people
were just really bad at judging their own abilities and
levels of knowledge, without a psychologically motivated
component, we would expect their self-assessments to
form a normal distribution around the actual ability level.
Some people (or all people some of the time) would
wildly over-estimate their abilities, and some people (or
all people some of the time) would wildly under-estimate
their abilities. Consequently, the average would hover
pretty near the actual ability level. This is, in fact, the
pattern we see when people are assessing peers’
performance. But that pattern doesn’t appear with selfassessments. Most people assess themselves as being
“above average” on any given task, sort of the Lake
Wobegon Effect. There is a rosy glow that surrounds our
self-estimates. (To be thorough, it should be noted that
very high-achieving people initially under-estimate their
own percentile ranking on various skills. They fail to
recognize not necessarily how good they are, but how
bad most other people are. After feedback about their
performance, however, high-performing people begin to
give more accurate self-assessments (Kruger & Dunning,
1999).)
If the only problems with indirect measures of
student learning were ones that resulted in an inflation of
actual learning, these measures could be made useful by
simply applying a correction factor, making program
comparisons using the same distorted measure. So if
Psychology majors reported mean confidence of 8 and
English majors reported mean confidence of 6, if the
only factors distorting the reports were creating main
effects of rosy-glow, an administrator could conclude
that the Psychology program was doing a better job than
the English program at meeting learning outcomes, even
though the actual achievement was probably lower than
the 8 and the 6 would imply.
However, there is an issue underlying selfevaluation that makes applying this correction
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impossible. This is the discrepancy between knowledge
and awareness of knowledge. While it is true that people
are often aware of the things that they know, it is equally
likely if not more common that they are unaware of what
they do not know. Kruger and Dunning (1999) have
discussed the topic of the interaction between knowledge
and the awareness of knowledge. They claim that people
who are deficient at a task are doubly disabled. Primarily,
they do not know how to perform the task at hand.
Secondly, although not of lesser importance, these
individuals do not realize that they are not successful at
completing the task. This phenomenon shows itself
through indirect measures of learning. Individuals at the
lowest levels of mastery inflate their abilities most and
those at the highest levels of mastery actually understate
their abilities. Kruger and Dunning (1999) showed this
pattern of the least competent being least able to assess
their own competence across judgments ranging from
ability to judge funniness of jokes to grammatical skills to
logic abilities. In all cases, participants whose abilities
were objectively in the lowest quartile overrated their
own abilities and often considered themselves to be
above average. Kruger and Dunning argued that those in
the lowest quartile lack the meta-cognitive ability to
understand what “good performance” looks like, and are
thus unable to recognize their own mistakes as failures.
Kruger and Dunning showed that giving the students
feedback about how well others had performed did not
lower their ratings of their own abilities (although this
feedback did cause students in the top-quartile to
increase their ratings of their own ability more in line
with their actual ability).

Remedies
The only way Kruger and Dunning found to
increase the accuracy of the ratings of students from the
lowest quartile was to teach them the skill in question.
Once they had been trained on what that skill actually
involved, they reported that their own skill level was
lower than they had reported it prior to such training. So,
paradoxically, once participants had some clue about
what the skill actually involved, they lowered their ratings
of their own ability. Applying this finding, a professor
who succeeds in teaching students the actual skills
involved in the learning outcomes might be met with
lower mean self-assessments of achievement from
students, as the students in the lowest quartile come to
report their ability more accurately.
As any professor knows who has heard students
swear they know the material backward and forward,
only to next hear them claim the retina is in the middle
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ear, students often persist in believing they have
mastered material even in the face of exam scores to the
contrary. How many students have argued (to no avail)
that they totally understand the material but the test
didn’t measure their knowledge correctly, or they know
the material but they just couldn’t produce it at the time
of the test, or, nearer the end of the meeting with the
professor, maybe they didn’t know the material on the
last test, but they certainly will know it now? If Kruger
and Dunning are correct, these students don’t even know
what “knowing the material” is, let alone how to get
there.
The realization that self-assessments generally do
not accurately reflect actual learning or mastery leads to
the inevitable conclusion that real program effects
cannot be known with any certainty through indirect
measures of learning or accomplishment. Although selfassessments might be useful for motivating students or
measuring perceived learning, they do not measure actual
learning. Real learning can only be assessed via direct
measures of the skill or knowledge that was meant to be
learned. Direct assessments are often difficult to do,
time-consuming, expensive, and fraught with attrition
and other practical problems. How do researchers
convince teachers who are racing to cover all the material
that time is needed for direct measures of learning? Who
funds the long-term follow-up, years after the program
(and likely the mandate that funded it) has ended? How
can researchers gain cooperation from administrators
who were not involved with the original study? Solutions
to these problems need to be built into the original
research design and contract. Efforts to educate funders
and consumers of research about the limitations of
indirect measures are necessary to ensure that direct
measures are properly understood and valued.
In summary, to build evaluations on indirect
measures of what participants report they have learned
or mastered is to risk untold confusion and inaccurate
conclusions. Programs that succeed in teaching the
participants to assess their own performance accurately
would fare very poorly in comparison with programs that
let natural biases bloom, and programs that could reach
the participants at the bottom of the ability distribution
and teach them what mastery looks like would fare least
well of all, as the participants might then accurately
report that they actually have not mastered the material.
Indirect measures based on what participants think they
have learned or how confident they are in their abilities
are not totally useless. For example, they can tell us if the
students happily think they are wizards at statistical
analysis or understanding the Civil War or writing essays.
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They just don’t tell us if those confident students think
the retina is in the ear. To borrow a term from the
introduction to the Dunning, Heath, and Suls
monograph, we won’t know if the participants have
actually learned or if they are just “blissfully
incompetent.”

References
Alicke, M.D., Klotz, M.I., Breitenbecher, D.I., Yurak,
T.J., & Vredenburg, D.S. (1995). Personal contact,
individuation and the better-than-average effect.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68,
804 – 825.
Brown, J.D. (1986). Evaluations of self and others: Selfenhancement biases in social judgments. Social
Cognition, 4, 353-376.
Cross, P. (1977). Not can but will college teaching be
improved? New Directions for Higher Education,
17, 1-15.
Dunning, D., Heath, C. & Suls, J. (2004). Flawed selfassessment: Implications for health, education, and
the workplace. Psychological Science in the Public
Interest, 5, 71 – 106.
Hacker, D.J., Bol, L., Horgan, D., & Rakow, E. (2000).
Test prediction and performance in a classroom
context. Journal of Educational Psychology, 92, 160
– 170.
Kahneman, D. & Tversky, A. (1979). Intuitive
prediction: Biases and corrective procedures.
Management Science, 12, 313-327.
Krueger, J. (1998). On the perception of social
consensus. Advances in Experimental Social
Psychology, 30, 163-240.
Krueger, J. & Mueller, R.A. (2002). Unskilled, unaware,
or both? The contribution of social – perceptual
skills and statistical regression to self-enhancement
biases. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
82, 180-188.
Kruger, J. (1999). Lake Wobegon be gone! The "belowaverage effect" and the egocentric nature of
comparative ability judgments. Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology, 77, 221 - 232.
Kruger, J. & Dunning, D. (1999). Unskilled and unaware
of it: How difficulties in recognizing one’s own
incompetence lead to inflated self-assessments.
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77,
1121-1134.
Kruger, J. & Dunning, D. (2002). Unskilled and
unaware—but why? A reply to Krueger and Mueller

5

Practical Assessment, Research, and Evaluation, Vol. 17 [2012], Art. 6

Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, Vol 17, No 6
Heath, DeHoek, & Locatelli, Indirect Measures in Evaluation
(2002). Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 82, 189 – 192.
Miller, D.T. & Ross, M. (1975). Self-serving biases in the
attribution of causality: Fact or fiction?
Psychological Bulletin, 82, 213-225.

Page 6
Noonan, B. & Duncan, C.R. (2005). Peer and selfassessment in high schools. Practical Assessment,
Research & Evaluation, 10 (17).
Ross, J.A. (2006). The reliability, validity, and utility of
self-assessment. Practical Assessment, Research &
Evaluation, 11(10).

Citation:
Heath, Linda, DeHoek, Adam & Locatelli, Sara House (2012). Indirect Measures In Evaluation: On Not Knowing What
We Don’t Know. Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation, 17(6). Available online:
http://pareonline.net/getvn.asp?v=17&n=6

Acknowledgements
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 2005 meetings of the American Evaluation Association. Portions of
this work were supported by funds from the Illinois Mathematics and Science Partnership program which was funded by
NCLB, Title II, Part B, U.S. Department of Education in FY 2007, David Slavsky, P.I., Grant # 14-016-9000-01-51.

Authors:
Linda Heath (Corresponding Author)
Department of Psychology
Loyola University Chicago
1032 W. Sheridan Rd.
Chicago, IL 60660
LHeath [at] luc.edu

Adam DeHoek
Department of Psychology
Loyola University Chicago
1032 W. Sheridan Rd.
Chicago, IL 60660
Sara House Locatelli
Department of Psychology
Loyola University Chicago
1032 W. Sheridan Rd.
Chicago, IL 60660

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/pare/vol17/iss1/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/00h8-7p49

6

